In one study (40), subjects were instructed by a second experimenter to deceive the first experimenter. This deception, though described as ''dishonest,'' involves neither temptation nor, in our estimation, morally questionable behavior.
What makes people behave honestly when confronted with opportunities for dishonest gain? Research on the interplay between controlled and automatic processes in decision making suggests 2 hypotheses: According to the ''Will'' hypothesis, honesty results from the active resistance of temptation, comparable to the controlled cognitive processes that enable the delay of reward. According to the ''Grace'' hypothesis, honesty results from the absence of temptation, consistent with research emphasizing the determination of behavior by the presence or absence of automatic processes. To test these hypotheses, we examined neural activity in individuals confronted with opportunities for dishonest gain. Subjects undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) gained money by accurately predicting the outcomes of computerized coin-flips. In some trials, subjects recorded their predictions in advance. In other trials, subjects were rewarded based on self-reported accuracy, allowing them to gain money dishonestly by lying about the accuracy of their predictions. Many subjects behaved dishonestly, as indicated by improbable levels of ''accuracy.'' Our findings support the Grace hypothesis. Individuals who behaved honestly exhibited no additional control-related activity (or other kind of activity) when choosing to behave honestly, as compared with a control condition in which there was no opportunity for dishonest gain. In contrast, individuals who behaved dishonestly exhibited increased activity in control-related regions of prefrontal cortex, both when choosing to behave dishonestly and on occasions when they refrained from dishonesty. Levels of activity in these regions correlated with the frequency of dishonesty in individuals.
dishonesty ͉ fMRI ͉ honesty ͉ lie detection ͉ moral judgment R ecent research in moral psychology/neuroscience has focused on the respective roles of automatic and controlled processes in moral judgment (1, 2) , particularly in the context of hypothetical dilemmas involving life-and-death tradeoffs (''trolley problems'') (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) . Comparably little is known about the cognitive processes that generate honest and dishonest behavior (12, 13) , and the neural bases of choices to behave honestly or dishonestly have, to our knowledge, never been studied specifically. Though there is much recent research on brain-based lie detection (14) , subjects in these experiments are instructed to lie, and therefore their behavior is not genuinely dishonest.* Moreover, studies examining instructed lies do not examine the choice to lie.
The present study uses fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) and a behavioral design inspired by research on moral hypocrisy (15) to examine the neural bases of honest and dishonest choices. More specifically, this study tests 2 competing hypotheses concerning the cognitive nature of honesty. According to the ''Will'' hypothesis, honesty results from the active resistance of temptation, comparable to the controlled cognitive processes that enable individuals to delay gratification (16, 17) . According to the ''Grace'' hypothesis, honesty results from the absence of temptation, consistent with research emphasizing the determination of behavior by the presence or absence of automatic processes (1, 18) . These hypotheses make competing predictions concerning the engagement of prefrontal structures associated with cognitive control (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) in honest individuals as they choose to refrain from dishonest behavior.
Subjects undergoing fMRI attempted to predict the outcomes of random computerized coin-flips and were financially rewarded for accuracy and punished for inaccuracy. In the No Opportunity condition, subjects recorded their predictions in advance, denying them the opportunity to cheat by lying about their accuracy. In the Opportunity condition, subjects made their predictions privately and were rewarded based on their selfreported accuracy, affording them the opportunity to cheat. (Fig.  1) We used a cover story to justify our giving subjects obvious opportunities for dishonest gain. This study was presented as a study of paranormal abilities to ''predict the future,'' aimed at testing the hypotheses that people are better able to predict the future when their predictions are (i) private and (ii) financially incentivized. Thus, subjects were implicitly led to believe, first, that the opportunity for dishonest gain was a known but unintended by-product of the experiment's design and, second, that they were expected to behave honestly. We note that in employing this cover story, subjects were deceived about the experimenters' interests, but not about the economic structure of the task.
Thirty-five subjects were classified as honest, dishonest, or ambiguous based on self-reported accuracy in the Opportunity condition ( Fig. 2 ). We emphasize that these labels describe these subjects' present behavior only and that we make no claims concerning their more general behavioral tendencies. Fourteen subjects reporting improbably high levels of accuracy at the individual level (one-tailed binomial test, P Ͻ 0.001), 69% or higher, were classified as dishonest (M ''accuracy'' ϭ 84%). This conservative threshold was used to ensure an adequate number of cheat trials per dishonest subject. The 14 lowest-accuracy subjects (M accuracy ϭ 52%) were classified as honest. This was the largest group of subjects exhibiting no significant evidence of cheating at the group level (486/926 trials, P Ͼ 0.05). Measures were taken to exclude dishonest subjects who disguised their cheating by underreporting accuracy for relatively low-value Opportunity trials. The remaining 7 subjects (M ϭ 62%) were classified as ambiguous. (See Methods and supporting information (SI) Text for further discussion of subject classifications/ exclusions.)
As noted above, the Will and Grace hypotheses make competing predictions concerning the neural activity of honest individuals when they choose to refrain from dishonest behavior. More specifically, these hypotheses make competing predictions concerning the following comparison within the honest group:
Opportunity Loss trials (in which the subject lost money because s/he chose not to cheat) vs. No-Opportunity Loss trials (in which the subject lost money and could do nothing about it). According to the Will hypothesis, forgoing an opportunity for dishonest gain requires the active resistance of temptation. Thus, the Will hypothesis predicts that, in the honest group, the Opportunity Loss trials (relative to No-Opportunity Loss trials) will preferentially engage brain regions associated with response conflict, cognitive control, and/or response inhibition. Such regions include the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (19, 20) , the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (20, 21, 23) , and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLFPC) (22, 24, 25) . For convenience we refer to these regions as the ''control network,'' but our use of this label does not imply a one-to-one mapping of structure to function. (See SI Text for further discussion.) According to the Grace hypothesis, honest behavior follows from the absence of temptation, implying no need to actively resist temptation when the opportunity for dishonest gain is present. Thus, the Grace hypothesis, in its strongest form, predicts that honest individuals will exhibit no additional control-related activity when they choose to refrain from dishonest behavior. Both of these hypotheses also make competing predictions concerning reaction time (RT). The Will hypothesis predicts that honest individuals will exhibit increased RTs when they choose to refrain from dishonest behavior, reflecting the engagement of additional controlled cognitive processes in actively resisting temptation. In contrast, the Grace hypothesis, in its strongest form, predicts that honest individuals will exhibit no difference in RT between Opportunity Loss trials and No-Opportunity Loss trials.
With respect to dishonest individuals, there are at least 3 reasons to expect increased control network activity for Opportunity trials. First, research on instructed lying consistently implicates control network activity in decisions to lie (14, 26) , possibly because honesty is the default response in such contexts. Second, dishonest individuals may engage cognitive control in resisting the temptation to lie, however infrequently or unsuccessfully. Third, control network activity may be engaged in the process of actively deciding whether to lie, independent of the choice made. The present study is not designed to distinguish among these processes, but may offer guidance for future research. As an alternative to all 3 of these hypotheses, one might suppose that individuals who cheat do so automatically, engaging no additional control processes. We note that this hypothesis, though analogous to the Grace hypothesis, is distinct from the Grace hypothesis because it applies to dishonest behavior rather than honest behavior.
Results
Behavioral Data. Table 1 summarizes the RT data. Here we report on planned contrasts following a 2 (group: Honest vs. Dishonest) ϫ 2 (condition: Opportunity vs. No Opportunity) ϫ 2 (outcome: Win vs. Loss) mixed-effects ANOVA with subject as a random effect using the residual maximum likelihood (REML) fitting method. We compared Opportunity Win trials, which include both honest and dishonest wins, to No-Opportunity Win (1) observes the trial's monetary value and privately predicts the outcome of the upcoming coin flip, (2) records this prediction by pressing 1 of 2 buttons (No Opportunity condition) or presses one of these buttons randomly (Opportunity condition), (3) observes the outcome of the coin flip, (4) indicates whether the prediction was accurate, (5) observes the amount of money won/lost based on the recorded prediction (No Opportunity) or the reported accuracy (Opportunity), and (6) waits for the next trial. Op, opportunity. Button presses in response to screen 2 in the Opportunity condition and screen 4 in the No Opportunity condition control for motor activity.
Fig. 2.
Distribution of self-reported percent Wins in the Opportunity condition. Subjects were classified into 3 groups based on the probability that they behaved dishonestly. Mean percent Wins in the No Opportunity condition was 50%. See Table 1 for reaction time data. Table S1 for a summary of fMRI contrasts.) To identify neural activity associated with choosing to behave dishonestly, we separately analyzed the data from the dishonest group. (See following text for group comparisons.) We compared Opportunity Win trials (which include both honest and dishonest wins) to No-Opportunity Win trials (which include only honest wins). This comparison revealed increased activity bilaterally in the DLPFC for Opportunity Win trials, associating these regions with choosing to lie ( Fig. 3A and Table S1 ). Critically, these 2 conditions, both here and in subsequent contrasts, did not differ significantly in mean reward/punishment per trial (signed Wilcoxon rank sum, P Ͼ 0.5). Thus, the findings reported here cannot be explained in terms of differing levels of reward. The reverse contrast (No-Opportunity Wins Ͼ Opportunity Wins) yielded no significant effects.
To identify neural activity associated with choosing to refrain from dishonest behavior in the dishonest group (limited honesty) we compared Opportunity Loss trials (limited honest losses) to No-Opportunity Loss trials (forced losses). This comparison revealed increased activity for Opportunity Loss trials bilaterally in the control network ( Fig. 3B and Table S1 ). The reverse contrast yielded no significant effects. Thus, consistent with the RT data, we find that control network activity is most robustly associated not with lying, but with refraining from lying in individuals who are willing to lie in the present context (i.e., with limited honesty).
To identify neural activity associated with honest behavior, we repeated the previous analyses in the honest group. Once again, the critical test for the Will and Grace hypotheses is the comparison between Opportunity Loss trials and No-Opportunity Loss trials. Consistent with the RT data, this comparison revealed no significant effects. This null result is striking in that the same contrast (with identical power and statistical thresholds) revealed robust activation in dishonest subjects ( Fig. 3B ). To further explore this finding, we conducted a spatially restricted analysis using a region of interest (ROI) mask generated by the same contrast in dishonest subjects ( Fig.  3B ) and a dramatically reduced voxelwise threshold (P Ͻ 0.05). This contrast also yielded no significant effects. A voxelwise analysis restricted to the PFC confirmed this group ϫ condition interaction in the R DLPFC, ACC/SMA, and DMPFC (P Ͻ 0.05 corrected). A whole-brain analysis (Fig. S1) confirmed this interaction in the R parietal lobe (P Ͻ 0.001 uncorrected). The L DLPFC and bilateral VLPFC exhibited this interaction as well, but at lower thresholds (see Tables S1 and S2 ). Thus, the honest subjects, unlike the dishonest subjects, showed no sign of engaging additional control processes (or other processes) when choosing to forgo opportunities for dishonest gain. These findings support the Grace hypothesis. Critically, all 14 honest subjects stated in debriefing that they were aware of the opportunity to cheat, indicating that their honest behavior was not due to ignorance.
Comparing Opportunity Wins to No-Opportunity Wins re- vealed increased activity for Opportunity Wins bilaterally in the VLPFC and no significant effects for the reverse contrast ( Fig.  3C and Table S1 ). These VLPFC regions are ventral to those identified previously. Neither the Will nor Grace hypothesis explains why honest subjects would exhibit increased VLPFC activity when choosing to accept honest wins. † We emphasize, however, that this result is not inconsistent with the Grace hypothesis, which specifically predicts the absence of additional control network activity for only those trials in which honest subjects forgo dishonest wins (Opportunity Loss trials). The present findings suggest that individual differences in control network activity may be correlated with individual differences in the presence/frequency of dishonest behavior. To explore this possibility, we performed a backward stepwise multiple regression analysis using each subject's self-reported percent Wins in the Opportunity condition (an estimate of lying frequency) as the dependent variable. We initially entered into the model 18 independent neural variables for each subject, consisting of the mean percent signal change (averaged over 3 postdecision time points) in spherical ROIs corresponding to each of the 9 brain regions identified in our analyses of dishonest subjects, for both Opportunity Win and Opportunity Loss trials. We also included each subject's mean RT for Opportunity Win and Opportunity Loss trials. Following stepwise reduction, the resulting model captured 79% of the variance using 5 brain regions and 7 independent variables ( Fig. 4 and Table S3 ).
Discussion
The behavioral and fMRI data support the Grace hypothesis over the Will hypothesis, suggesting that honest moral decisions depend more on the absence of temptation than on the active resistance of temptation. Individuals who behaved honestly showed no sign of engaging additional controlled cognitive processes when choosing to behave honestly. These individuals exhibited no additional neural activity of any kind when they chose to forgo opportunities for dishonest gain, as compared with control trials in which there was no such opportunity. We provided a more stringent test of this negative result by dramatically reducing the statistical threshold for this comparison, focusing on brain regions that exhibited effects for this comparison in dishonest subjects (Fig. 3B ). This more-stringent test also revealed no effects, and further tests (group ϫ contrast interaction) confirmed that the honest and dishonest subjects exhibited different patterns of activity in these regions. The RT data support the Grace hypothesis as well: Honest individuals took no longer to forgo opportunities for dishonest gain than they did to report their forced losses in control trials. Dishonest individuals, in contrast, took considerably longer to forgo opportunities for dishonest gain. This convergent support for the Grace hypothesis is somewhat surprising. We conducted a survey to assess the a priori plausibility of the Will and Grace hypotheses and found that ordinary people tend to favor the Will hypothesis (See SI Text).
Dishonest behavior was associated with neural activity in brain regions associated with cognitive control, including the ACC (19, 20) , DLPFC (20, 21, 23) , and VLPFC (22, 24, 25) ( Fig. 3 A and  B) . Moreover, patterns of activity in these control-related regions were correlated with individual differences in the frequency of dishonest behavior ( Fig. 4 and Table S3 ). These findings are consistent with prior research examining instructed lying (14) in associating control network activity with lying. However, in contrast to prior studies, ‡ we find that control network activity is most robustly associated, not with lying per se, but with the limited honesty of individuals who are willing to lie in the present context. It is unlikely that control network activity associated with limited honesty (Fig. 3B ) is related to overcoming a default honesty response because such responses are themselves honest. However, this hypothesis may still explain the DLPFC activity observed in association with decisions to lie (Fig.  3A) . Alternatively, all of the observed control network activity may reflect (often unsuccessful) attempts to resist temptation. Finally, this activity may reflect the process of actively deciding whether to lie, independent of the choice made. This may be the most parsimonious explanation, given that control network activity was observed in decisions to lie as well as decisions to refrain from lying in dishonest individuals. The fact that control network activity was more robust and widespread in association with decisions to not lie may be explained by the fact that all Opportunity Loss trials involve decisions not to lie, whereas only a minority of Opportunity Win trials involve decisions to lie because most Opportunity Win trials are won honestly. Consistent with this idea, a direct comparison of Opportunity Win to Opportunity Loss trials revealed no effects in the control network (Table S1 ), suggesting that the patterns of activity associated with lying and refraining from lying in dishonest individuals are not so dissimilar. Finally, we emphasize that the control network activity observed in association with limited honesty is not inconsistent with the Grace hypothesis. This is because the Grace hypothesis applies only to honest decisions in individuals who consistently behaved honestly and not to decisions reflecting limited honesty.
Although the tasks in the Opportunity and No Opportunity conditions are nearly identical, they differ at the first response stage (recording prediction vs. random button-press; see Fig. 1 ). Thus, one might suppose that it is this task difference, rather than processing related to dishonesty, that explains the effects observed when comparing these conditions. However, if that were so, such effects should also be observed in the honest group, but they were not. In addition, this would not explain why activity in the regions identified correlates with the frequency of dis- † It is possible that this activity reflects the honest subjects' pride or self-doubt upon accepting legitimately won rewards, respectively positive and negative responses to these events. This interpretation is consistent with the implication of this region in the regulation of ''self-conscious emotion'' (42) . ‡ One study (41) did find increased prefrontal activity in association with the reporting of ''salient truth,'' but the regions identified in this study appear to overlap minimally with those identified here. Table S3 ).
honest behavior ( Fig. 4 ). Finally, peak response time in these regions is more consistent with these effects being related to the accuracy reports (Ϸ5 sec earlier) than the prediction/random responses (Ϸ8 sec earlier) (27) (See Fig. S2 and related discussion in SI Text).
RT data are often used to identify the engagement of additional cognitive processing in task performance. We note that, here, the fMRI data complemented and/or outstripped the RT data in this capacity in at least 3 ways. First, the fMRI data revealed increased bilateral DLPFC activity in association with decisions to lie (Opportunity Win trials Ͼ No-Opportunity Win trials), whereas the RT data revealed no effect for this comparison. Second, though the RT data accounted for 27% of the individual behavioral variance, the fMRI data accounted for 79% of this variance, including all of the variance accounted for by the RT data. Finally, given that fMRI data can identify the engagement of additional cognitive processes that are not apparent in RT data, the null results observed in the fMRI data provide support for the Grace hypothesis that is complementary to, and probably stronger than, that supplied by the RT data.
Although our present focus is on the cognitive neuroscience of honesty and dishonesty, our findings and methods may be of interest to researchers studying brain-based lie detection (14) , in part because the present study is arguably the first to establish a correlation between patterns of neural activity and real lying. However, the present experiment has several notable limitations that deserve attention. First, the model we have developed has not been tested on an independent sample, and therefore its probative value remains unknown. Second, our task design does not allow us to identify individual lies. Third, our findings highlight the challenge in distinguishing lying from related cognitive processes such as deciding whether to lie. Finally, it is not known whether our task is an ecologically valid model for real-world lying. For example, the neural signature of real prepared lies (28) may look different from the patterns observed in association with lying here. Bearing these limitations in mind, our findings may suggest new avenues for research on brainbased lie detection. For example, our findings suggest that interrogations aimed at eliciting indecision about whether to lie, rather than lies per se, may be more effective, provided that the goal is to assess the trustworthiness of the subject rather than the veracity of specific statements.
Several further limitations of the present study deserve attention. First, we cannot determine how many of our dishonest subjects were aware of their dishonesty (13) . Some subjects spontaneously confessed in debriefing, but we did not, in this first study, probe dishonest subjects concerning their levels of selfawareness due to this topic's sensitive nature. Second, although our analyses revealed no evidence of temptation and consequent control in the honest subjects, it is not known whether these subjects experienced and willfully extinguished temptation early in the experiment. Third, although many honest subjects claimed in debriefing to have behaved honestly for moral reasons (e.g., ''I was feeling moral''), we cannot here make claims concerning these subjects' motivations for behaving honestly (13) . In calling these subjects ''honest,'' we are claiming only that they engaged in no (or very little) dishonest behavior. The data, however, do not support the hypothesis that their honest behavior was actively motivated by processes present only in the Opportunity condition, such as concern with being caught. If that were so, we would expect to observe some kind of increased activity in the honest subjects for the contrast Opportunity Loss Ͼ No-Opportunity Loss, but no such activity was observed. Finally, as noted previously, it is not known whether the behavior observed here reflects stable dispositions to behave honestly or dishonestly (29) (30) (31) . The present findings do suggest, however, that some individuals can, at least temporarily, achieve a state of moral grace.
Methods
Subjects. We report data from 35 healthy adults (18 females, 17 males, ages 18 -58, mean age 24 years). All were right-handed, native English speakers and were screened for the absence of any history of psychiatric and neurological problems. In addition to the data drawn from these 35 subjects, data from 8 subjects were discarded for technical reasons (excessive head movement, software/hardware failures, image artifact). Data from 4 subjects were discarded due to unbalanced factors (too few self-reported losses in the Opportunity condition) as recommended by AFNI (32) . Data from 4 subjects were discarded due to suspicions revealed in debriefing concerning the study's purpose. Data from one subject were discarded due to ignorance of the possibility of cheating revealed in debriefing. Data from one subject were discarded due to evidence that the subject deliberately underreported accuracy for relatively low-value Opportunity trials to disguise cheating. To ensure an adequate balance of honest and dishonest subjects, some subjects were recruited from a pool of participants who participated in pilot testing. These subjects were not debriefed before participating in the present study. (See SI Text for further discussion of subject exclusions/inclusions.) Subjects were paid $75 by check for participating, in addition to winnings from the experimental task.
Procedures. All experimental procedures complied with guidelines of the Harvard University and Partners Healthcare IRBs. Subjects gave written informed consent and filled out the following personality/psychometric inventories: the Ten-Item Personality Measure (33), the Need for Cognition Scale (34), the Disgust Scale (Revised) (35, 36) , a 3-item delayed discounting questionnaire (Greene Lab instrument), and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (37) . Exploratory results related to these questionnaires were inconclusive and are not reported here. To support our cover story, we also had subjects complete the Paranormal Belief Scale (38) . Subjects were given detailed directions and completed a minimum of 8 practice trials to ensure task competence. (See SI Text.) At this point some subjects mentioned to the experimenter that it was possible to cheat. The experimenter responded by acknowledging his awareness of that possibility, explained that the possibility of cheating was a necessary by-product of the experimental design, and encouraged the subject to follow the directions (which preclude cheating if followed).
Subjects completed a total of 210 trials as described in Fig. 1 . Within the 70 Opportunity trials, the values $3, $4, $5, $6, or $7 USD each appeared 14 times, as was the case for the 70 No Opportunity trials. (See SI Text regarding deviations.) We included an additional set of 70 low-value Opportunity trials that were worth $0.02, $0.10, $0.25, $0.35, and $0.50 USD. Each of these values also appeared 14 times. Data from these trials were not analyzed. They were included to provide dishonest subjects with additional opportunities for ''limited honesty,'' giving them cover for cheating in the regular (highervalue) Opportunity trials. Subjects were paid the cumulative value of their winnings/losses. Net losses were capped at $0, and net winnings were capped at $75 (not including participation payment). Trials appeared in random order in a series of 7 blocks of 30 trials each. Subjects' understanding of the experiment was assessed in debriefing. They were asked in an open-ended way about their thoughts and experiences during the experiment. Subsequently, subjects were informed of the true nature of the experiment and were asked whether they were aware that they could cheat. Some subjects were excluded based on their responses to these questions (See previous text and SI Text).
Image Acquisition. Images were acquired using a 3.0 T Siemens Magnetom Tim Trio full-body scanner at the Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging of Massachusetts General Hospital. A high-resolution, whole-brain structural scan (1 mm isotropic voxel MPRAGE) was acquired before functional imaging. T2*-weighted functional images were acquired in 33 axial slices parallel to the AC-PC line with a 0.5-mm interslice gap, affording full-brain coverage. Images were acquired using an EPI pulse sequence, with a TR of 2,500 ms, a TE of 30 ms, a flip angle of 90, a FOV of 200 mm, and 3.0 ϫ 3.0 ϫ 5.0 mm voxels. Four additional images included at the start of each run to allow for signal stabilization were discarded.
Image Analysis. Image preprocessing and analysis used the AFNI software package (32) . Images were slice-time corrected, motion corrected, spatially smoothed using an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian filter, despiked, and normalized to percent signal change within run. fMRI data were analyzed using multiple regression at the subject level and a mixed effects ANOVA followed by planned contrasts (voxelwise uncorrected threshold P Ͻ 0.001, cluster Ն8) at the group level. Data were fitted using 28 ''tent'' regressors (piecewise linear splines) corresponding to 7 time points (0, 2.5, ϩ5, ϩ7.5, ϩ10, ϩ12.5, ϩ15 sec postresponse), 2 conditions (Opportunity, No Opportunity), and 2 behavioral outcomes (Win, Loss). Beta weights from time points corresponding to the decision period (ϩ5, ϩ7.5, and ϩ10 sec following the appearance of screen 4) were averaged to generate 4 parametric maps for each subject, corresponding to the 4 main cells: condition (Opportunity vs. No Opportunity) ϫ outcome (Win vs. Loss). Individual subject data were analyzed using a general linear model that included 6 sets of motion parameters as regressors of no interest. Images were then resampled to 3.0 mm isotropic voxels and spatially normalized to the standard coordinate space of Talairach and Tournoux (39) for group analyses. Subjects were classified as honest, dishonest, or ambiguous as described in the main text (see Fig. 2 ). Data for honest and dishonest subjects were first separately submitted to mixed-effects ANOVAs with subject as a random effect and condition and outcome as fixed effects. For each group, the following planned contrasts were performed using a voxelwise threshold of P Ͻ 0.001 and a cluster threshold of 8 voxels using a third nearest-neighbor algorithm: Opportunity Wins vs. No-Opportunity Wins, Opportunity Losses vs. No-Opportunity Losses, Opportunity Wins vs. Opportunity Losses. To test for group differences (group ϫ condition interactions), we conducted voxelwise analyses over the PFC (defined anatomically by AFNI) using a voxelwise threshold of P Ͻ 0.05 and a cluster threshold of 199 voxels, corresponding to a corrected threshold of P Ͻ 0.05 (algorithm from AFNI AlphaSim). We also tested for these interactions using whole-brain and ROI-based analyses (see Tables S1 and S2). To minimize the biased selection of voxels for our individual differences regression analysis, we replaced our functionally defined ROIs ( Fig.  3 A and B) 
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Greene and Paxton 10.1073/pnas.0900152106 SI Text SI Methods and Related Discussion. The present experimental design differs substantially from those used previously in cognitive neuroscience and moral psychology. For this reason, we here attempt to anticipate concerns and misunderstandings that are likely to arise from our methods and interpretation. This section includes supplemental methodological information and addresses related concerns. The SI Discussion that follows addresses further concerns related to the interpretation of our data.
Exclusion of Subject for Strategic Underreporting of Accuracy. We classified subjects as ''honest'' or ''dishonest'' based on their reported levels of accuracy in the Opportunity condition. However, it is possible to gain money dishonestly while maintaining a chance level of accuracy by cheating in relatively high-value Opportunity trials and deliberately underreporting accuracy for relatively low-value Opportunity trials. Subjects who use this strategy should exhibit improbably high levels of cumulative reward given their win/loss percentages. To identify such subjects we compared the winnings of each honest subject to those of simulated honest subjects (10,000 permutations) with win/loss percentages individually matched to the subject being tested. Based on these findings, we discarded the data of one subject initially classified as honest whose winnings were improbably large given that subject's win/loss percentage (P ϭ 0.005). The winnings of all other honest subjects were consistent with their respective win/loss percentages (P Ͼ 0.05), making the excluded subject an extreme outlier. This subject was excluded because s/he could not be classified as ''honest'' (for obvious reasons) and did not meet our established, and rather conservative, criteria for inclusion in the ''dishonest'' group, which is based on selfreported accuracy in the Opportunity condition. Likewise, it did not make sense to include this subject in the ''ambiguous'' group because his/her self-reported accuracy appears to be distorted, and it is this accuracy report that is used in the individual differences analysis that includes the ''ambiguous'' subjects.
Exclusion of Subjects Based on Suspicion or Ignorance.
In debriefing, subjects were first asked, in an open-ended way, what they thought the experiment was about. At this point in debriefing, 4 subjects initially classified as dishonest, 1 subject classified as ambiguous, and 4 subjects classified as honest voiced suspicions that the experiment was about cheating/lying/dishonesty. We discarded the data from the 4 dishonest subjects, but not the others. Our aim in doing this was to exclude data from subjects who may be seen as morally justified in deceiving the experimenters because they believed that the experimenters were attempting to deceive them. We adopted this policy as a conservative measure, anticipating that some may hesitate to call such deception dishonest. (See the following discussion concerning our operational definitions of honesty and dishonesty.) We included the remaining subjects because it is not essential to our design that honest behavior be motivated by purely moral (rather than prudential) considerations. (See the following discussion.) Additional analyses verified that our key findings held when the 4 suspicious honest subjects were excluded.
Subjects were eventually informed of the purpose of the experiment and were asked whether they were aware that they could cheat. All but one subject indicated that they were aware of this. Data from this subject were excluded because our aim is to investigate honest behavior in the face of opportunity for dishonest gain, and this subject was not aware of the opportunity.
Inclusion of Subjects with Prior Participation.
To ensure an adequate supply of dishonest behavior for our fMRI experiment, we recruited subjects who, based on their performances in pilot testing, were likely to exhibit high levels of dishonest behavior in a second testing session, and while undergoing brain scanning. These subjects were not debriefed before their participation in the fMRI experiment. Two consequences of this procedure deserve attention. First, the distribution of honest/dishonest performances observed in the fMRI study (Fig. 2) is not necessarily representative of our subject pool. (The proportions of subjects reaching dishonesty threshold in pilot testing and in the present experiment were comparable, both at Ϸ40%, depending on exclusions. However, only 26% of first-time subjects reached dishonesty threshold in the present experiment, suggesting that the brain scanning environment may have reduced the level of dishonesty.) Second, the proportion of first-time and repeat subjects differs between the honest and dishonest groups, raising the possibility that our findings could be accounted for by differences in task experience rather than differences in honest/ dishonest behavior (11 of 14 honest subjects were first-time subjects; 5 of 14 dishonest subjects were first-time subjects). This alternative hypothesis could possibly explain why we observed differences in control network activity between groups. However, it cannot explain within-group (first-time group or repeatgroup) correlations between levels of control network activity and frequency of dishonest behavior.
Thus, to test this alternative hypothesis, we reexamined the results of our regression analysis correlating individual differences in control network activity with individual levels of dishonesty ( Fig. 4 and Table S2 ). To determine whether the success of the regression model depends on a confound based on first-time (n ϭ 19) vs. repeat (n ϭ 16) subjects, we separately assessed the accuracy of the model predictions for both groups. The correlations between model predictions and actual values were very high for both groups: r ϭ 0.89 (P Ͻ 0.0001) for first-time subjects and r ϭ 0.95 (P Ͻ 0001) for repeat subjects. Because the model accounts for most of the variance within the first-time subjects and within the repeat subjects, the success of the model cannot be explained in terms of confounding differences between these 2 groups. We note that this regression analysis is based on percent signal changes in ROIs identified by our 2 critical within-subject contrasts: Opportunity Wins Ͼ No-Opportunity Wins and Opportunity Losses Ͼ No-Opportunity Losses.
Probabilistic Classification of Subjects as Honest, Dishonest, or Ambiguous. One might object to our use of statistical methods to classify subjects as honest and dishonest. More specifically, one might claim that it is illegitimate to label behavior as dishonest simply because the evidence indicates that the subject in question probably cheated. We note, however, that most scientific conclusions are supported by statistical analyses culminating in probability estimates (P values). Thus, this objection, if taken seriously, would discredit not only our classification system, but the conclusions of most scientific papers. We emphasize further that our threshold for classifying an individual subject as dishonest is very conservative (P Ͻ 0.001). It is true that our method does not allow us to identify individual responses as dishonest, but this does not prevent us from identifying individual subjects as dishonest. (See discussion of implications for brain-based lie detection in following text.) Finally, we emphasize again that in labeling subjects as dishonest, we are describing their present behavior only and not ascribing to them stable personality traits.
Characteristics of Honest vs. Dishonest Subjects.
There were no significant differences in age (t test, P ϭ 0.16), gender ( 2 , P ϭ 0.7), or paranormal belief (t test, P ϭ 0.83) between honest and dishonest subjects.
Procedural Deviations. For 13 subjects, a stimulus programming error caused the properly randomized sequence of Opportunity and No Opportunity trials used in the first run to be repeated for subsequent runs. This error, although regrettable, does not compromise the findings presented here. Subjects were given no additional information that would allow them to make more accurate predictions, and the resulting changes in trial sequence did not confound the comparisons made in our analyses. The primary consequence of this error is that subjects did not necessarily respond to equal numbers of each trial type, thus reducing statistical power. Subjects may also have been able to anticipate upcoming trial types, but, once again, the repetition in sequencing provided subjects with no strategically useful information.
Subject Instructions. The following instructions were presented to subjects on a computer:
Thank you for participating. In this study your job is to predict the outcomes of computerized random coin flips. You may not think that you have the ability to do this, and that's okay. Just do your best. You may be surprised at what you can do! Press any key to continue.
It has been suggested that people make more accurate predictions when they are motivated to predict accurately. To test this idea, we will be providing you with varying levels of financial incentive. Before each coin flip happens, an amount of money will appear on the screen (e.g., $0.25 or $5.00). This is the amount of money that you will win or lose depending on whether you accurately predict the outcome of the coin flip. If your prediction is correct, then you win the amount of money shown. If your prediction is incorrect, you lose the amount of money shown. The computer will keep track of all of your wins and losses. If, at the end of the experiment, your money total is positive, you will be paid that amount. If your total is negative or zero, you will not win any additional money. This is not pretend money. This is real money that you will be paid based on your performance in the experiment. However, your winnings cannot exceed $75. Press any key to continue.
It has been suggested that people's ability to predict the future is disrupted if they have to record their predictions externally (i.e., outside of their minds). To test this idea, we will sometimes ask you to report your prediction in advance. In other cases, you will simply tell us after the fact whether or not your prediction was correct. Press any key to continue.
Before each coin flip you will see the dollar amount that the trial is worth and, below it, the word ''PREDICT'' on the screen. At that point you should make your prediction in your mind. Next you will either see the word ''RECORD'' or the word ''RANDOM.'' If you see the word ''RECORD'' you should press the button on the LEFT to indicate that you are predicting HEADS or the button on the RIGHT to indicate that you are predicting TAILS. If you see the word ''RANDOM'' then you should randomly press either the LEFT button or the RIGHT button. When you make random responses, you should not follow any fixed pattern. Press any key to continue.
Next you will see the word ''HEADS'' or ''TAILS'' appear on the screen. This is the outcome of the computerized coin flip. After that you will see a screen that says ''CORRECT?'' At that point you must indicate whether or not your prediction was correct. If you were told to hit a random button, it does not matter which button you hit.
Whether or not your prediction was correct depends only on the prediction you made in your mind and the outcome of the coin flip. Press the LEFT key to indicate (YES) that your prediction was correct. Press the RIGHT key to indicate (NO) that your prediction was incorrect. If you failed to form a prediction before the outcome of the coin flip was revealed, then you should indicate that your prediction was incorrect. After you have said whether your prediction was correct, the computer will tell you how much money you won or lost on that coin flip. Press any key to continue.
You will make a total of 210 predictions. You will do these in 7 groups of 30 trials. There will be about 10 seconds between the end of one trial and the beginning of the next one. After each group of trials you will have a chance to rest. The whole task will take a little less than 90 min. Press any key to continue.
You are now ready to practice. Remember, first comes the dollar amount telling you what the coin flip is worth and the word ''PREDICT.'' At that point you will make your prediction privately to yourself. (Note that the dollar amounts presented here will not count toward your final total.) Then you will see either ''RECORD'' or ''RANDOM. ' 
' If you see ''RECORD'' enter your prediction (LEFT key HEADS, RIGHT key for TAILS). If you see ''RAN-DOM'' press either the LEFT key or the RIGHT key randomly. Then you will see the outcome of the coin-flip (HEADS or TAILS). Then you will see the word ''CORRECT?'' on the screen. At that point you indicate whether the prediction you made in your mind was correct. Press the LEFT key (YES) if your prediction was correct or the RIGHT key (NO) if your prediction was incorrect.
Then the computer will tell you how much money you won or lost on that coin flip. Then you wait for the next coin flip, which will begin with a dollar amount, as before. Press any key to begin practicing.
SI Discussion
Defining Honesty and Dishonesty. In attempting to study honesty and dishonesty scientifically, one cannot avoid making assumptions about what it means to be honest or dishonest, despite that these terms are not precisely defined in ordinary discourse. For present purposes we have defined honesty and dishonesty in minimal behavioral terms, i.e., as behaviors that a reasonable person would regard as honest or dishonest given the circumstances. Were the honest people really honest? In refraining from lying, they knowingly ''left money on the table.'' This behavior must have some motivational basis, which we here refer to as honesty. This minimal, behavioral conception of honesty does not involve ascribing noble motivations to these individuals. In calling them honest, we are claiming only that they chose not to behave dishonestly. [It is a controversial philosophical question whether, and to what extent, more noble forms of honesty and other virtues exist (1) .] Were the ''dishonest'' people really dishonest? These individuals violated the rules of the game, to which they had agreed, and gained money as a result. What's more, most of the individuals we tested either did not violate these rules or did so less than they could have. This suggests a prevailing norm against the behavior we have called dishonest. We are agnostic as to whether this dishonest behavior is conscious or unconscious. In our opinion, the observed association between control network activity and dishonest behavior is no less significant, and is perhaps more significant, if it turns out that the dishonest behavior in question is largely unconscious.
Interpretation of Control Network Activity and Reverse Inference.
Because our conclusions do not depend on any specific interpretation of the observed control network activity, or even on the appropriateness of the ''control network'' label, our conclusions do not depend on any kind of problematic reverse inference (2) . With respect to the honest subjects, our key finding is that no brain regions, whether in the control network or elsewhere, exhibited significant increases in activity when honest subjects chose to forgo opportunities for dishonest gain (as compared with matched trials with no opportunity). Here there is no reverse inference because there are no regional brain activations to interpret. To the extent that we may accept the ''control network'' label as valid, we may infer that an analogue of the Grace hypothesis applied to dishonesty is probably false: Dishonest behavior appears to involve the engagement of additional controlled cognitive processes.
Attribution of fMRI BOLD Effects to Accuracy Reports. As noted in the main text, it is unlikely that the fMRI BOLD effects attributed to dishonest decisions ( Fig. 3 A and B) are related to the preceding behavioral responses whereby subjects recorded their predictions (No Opportunity) or pressed random buttons (Opportunity). Once again, this is because the honest subjects (who also recorded their predictions/pressed random buttons) did not exhibit such effects and because the fMRI data are correlated with the frequency of dishonest behavior (Fig. 4) . We also noted that the timing of the BOLD signal is more consistent with its being related to the accuracy reports than to the prediction/ random responses. This is illustrated in Fig. S2 , which depicts the mean time course of fMRI BOLD activity in the regions depicted in Fig. 3 A and B for the conditions that exhibited greater activity in the relevant contrasts. As Fig. S2 illustrates, the signal tends to peak Ϸ5 sec following the accuracy report, consistent with the typical 4-to 6-sec lag in peak BOLD response following a neural event (3) . If the signal were primarily related to the earlier behavioral responses, one would expect the signal to peak Ϸ3 sec earlier.
The RT data also speak against this alternative interpretation. As noted in the main text, accuracy reports took longer for Opportunity Loss trials than for No-Opportunity Loss trials (P Ͻ 0.0001) and for Opportunity Win trials (P Ͻ 0.0001), but only within the dishonest group. We performed parallel analyses on the RTs for the earlier behavioral responses. For the first contrast (dishonest: Opportunity Loss vs. No-Opportunity Loss) we found a marginally significant effect (P ϭ 0.04) in the direction opposite that predicted by the alternative hypothesis. That is, the dishonest subjects took slightly longer to record their predictions (No Opportunity) than to make their random button presses (Opportunity). This is consistent with their putting more effort into prediction in the No Opportunity condition (when they have to make a prediction), but this result cannot explain why Opportunity trials are associated with more control network activity. The second contrast (dishonest: Opportunity Loss vs. Opportunity Win) did not reveal any significant difference in the random button-press RTs (P ϭ 0.29). Thus, the RT data for the moral decisions converge with the fMRI data, but the RT data for the earlier behavioral responses do not. Is It Self-Evident That the Grace Hypothesis Is Correct? A common criticism of social-psychological research is that the conclusions reached are self-evident. Here, one might suppose that it is self-evident that the Grace hypothesis is correct. Indeed, the Grace hypothesis may be self-evidently correct with respect to some situations. For example, it seems highly unlikely (although not impossible) that ordinary law-abiding citizens actively resist the temptation to shoplift whenever they walk through a store with minimal security. Thus, one might wonder whether the situation examined here is also one in which it is self-evidently the case that honest behavior involves little active self-control.
To assess commonsense expectations concerning the psychology of honest behavior in our coin-flip prediction experiment, we conducted an additional survey. We emphasize, however, that this survey was not conducted to assess the validity of the conclusions drawn from our main experiment. Rather, we conducted this survey to empirically assess the extent to which our main conclusion is self-evident. [Other researchers have used similar techniques to assess the self-evidence of their conclusions, most famously Milgram (4) .]
Fifty subjects (27 females, mean age 27.5) completed a 1-page survey in Harvard Square and were compensated $2. The survey described the behavioral aspect of the coin-flip prediction experiment in detail and asked people to respond to the following 2 questions:
Question 1: Please circle the answer below that best describes how things would go if you were to participate in this experiment:
A. I would not be tempted to cheat, at least not for most of the experiment.
B. I would be tempted to cheat during much of the experiment, but I would resist that temptation and not cheat.
C. I would cheat. Question 2: Which of the following statements do you think best describes people who choose NOT to cheat in this experiment?
A. These people are not tempted to cheat, at least not for most of the experiment.
B. These people are tempted to cheat during much of the experiment, but they resist that temptation and don't cheat.
The results were as follows: Thus, a majority of survey subjects who thought that they themselves would behave honestly in this experiment thought that they would do so through substantial resistance of temptation (Will). Here, respondents did not significantly favor one hypothesis over the other (binomial test, P Ͼ 0.05), despite the fact that a majority favored the Will hypothesis. In response to question 2, the tendency to favor the Will hypothesis (answer B) was significant (binomial test, P Ͻ 0.02). Thus, it is by no means self-evident that the findings of our experiment would end up supporting the Grace hypothesis, and, if anything, common sense appears to favor the Will hypothesis. Table S2 for further details. BA, Brodmann area.
Fig. S2
. Time course of activity in brain regions exhibiting increased activity in the Opportunity condition (vs. No Opportunity) within dishonest subjects (see Fig. 3 A and B) . Data are shown for the Opportunity condition only. Bold responses tend to peak Ϸ5 sec following the accuracy report (moral decision). This is consistent with BOLD effects in these regions being related to accuracy reports, rather than prior behavioral responses, which occurred Ϸ8 sec before the peak responses in most regions. Note: No brain regions exhibited increased activity for the contrasts opposite those above. Voxelwise threshold is P Ͻ 0.001, uncorrected; cluster threshold ϭ 8 voxels; df ϭ 13. To test for Group ϫ Contrast interactions, we computed for each subject the mean percent signal change from baseline in each of the above ROIs. We then computed difference scores for each ROI for each subject, subtracting the percent signal change scores for the 2 cells that generated the ROI. We then made a between-group comparison of these difference scores for each ROI (2 rightmost columns). BA, Brodmann area; k, cluster size, Op, opportunity. Table S1 for functional ROI-based interaction analyses. BA, Brodmann area; k, cluster size; Op, opportunity. 
